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Abstract
Today, comparative social scientists have ample survey data to test the generalizability 
of theories related to political trust. Unless its measurement invariance has been estab-
lished, they run the risk of drawing invalid conclusions though. Based on different sets 
of items and dimensional models, previous studies have yielded diverging results regard-
ing the measurement invariance of political trust in Europe and former Soviet countries. 
Using a set of six items and contrasting three competing dimensional models, this study 
tests the measurement invariance of political trust across the globe in 32 electoral and 
liberal democracies. It uses multiple group confirmatory factor analysis and draws on data 
from the World Values Survey (wave 6, 2010-2014). Configural invariance of a revised 
two-dimensional model of trust in implementing and representative political institutions 
was established in 19 democracies when excluding trust in civil service. Full invariance of 
this model was established in three post-communist countries in eastern and southeastern 
Europe. The results corroborate that the measurement invariance of political trust must not 
be assumed. Conceptually, they provide reason to infer that, by and large, people in democ-
racies have a two-dimensional construct of political trust. Methodologically, they manifest 
that trust in civil service is an ambiguous item, which is not as meaningfully related to the 
construct of political trust as other items.
Keywords: measurement equivalence, measurement invariance, multiple group confirma-
tory factor analysis, political trust, trust in political institutions
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Introduction
Today more than ever, comparative social scientists can test the generalizability 
of theories pertaining to the changes, sources, and consequences of political trust 
thanks to the growing availability of cross-national survey data (Braun, 2013; 
Zmerli & van der Meer, 2017). This is a decisive, but not a conclusive step forward. 
Unless the comparability of political trust measures has been established, infer-
ences about the generalizability of political trust theories across the globe may be 
invalid (Davidov, Meulemann, Cieciuch, Schmidt, & Billiet, 2014).
The issue of comparability results from the fact that people’s political trust 
is a construct. As such, it is a latent property of individuals that cannot be mea-
sured directly (Jackman, 2008). Cross-national researchers therefore have to rely 
on observed measures such as survey items pertaining to trust in different political 
objects. According to the ‘response process model’ (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 
2000), answers to these items allow inferences about people’s underlying construct 
of political trust. Based on this assumption, studies commonly use political trust 
items to create additive or averaged index scores (see for example Catterberg & 
Moreno, 2006; Chang & Chu, 2006). 
While indices are a common and convenient measurement instrument, the 
index scores are not necessarily comparable across countries and over time. A 
key to valid comparisons is to establish the invariance of the measurement instru-
ment. “The general question of invariance of measurement is one of whether or 
not, under different conditions of observing and studying phenomena, measurement 
operations yield measures of the same attributes” (Horn & Mcardle, 1992, p. 117). 
Various forms of bias may systematically distort the invariance of measures (van 
de Vijver & Tanzer, 2004). For example, asking about people’s trust in a political 
institution such as civil service may be biased because civil service’s responsibili-
ties and tasks differ across countries. Or, owing to the translation of the response 
scales, the difference between ‘a great deal of trust’ as opposed to ‘quite a lot of 
trust’ may not be judged in the same way by respondents from different countries, 
thereby biasing their responses. 
Because of these potential biases, it is essential to test the measurement invari-
ance of the political trust items beforehand. The goal is to determine whether and 
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to what extent the proposed measurement model matches the observed structure 
of the data, thereby supporting the assumption that political trust can be measured 
across countries by a common set of items using the same number of latent fac-
tors (Milfont & Fischer, 2010). If measurement invariance is not tested beforehand, 
comparisons of observed differences in means may not reflect actual differences 
in people’s average level of political trust and regression coefficients may suggest 
false relationships. In addition, true country-specific or temporal differences may 
be obscured (Chen, 2008). Either way, using political trust indices without testing 
for measurement invariance may lead to invalid conclusions regarding the changes, 
sources, and consequences of political trust (Ariely & Davidov, 2012; Vandenberg 
& Lance, 2000). 
The lack of a common measurement model of political trust complicates such 
a test. First, there is no common set of political trust items and second, there is 
no agreement on the dimensionality of political trust.1 This is best exemplified by 
previous cross-country exploratory studies (see Table 1). They reach different con-
clusions regarding the dimensionality of political trust depending on the estimation 
method and specifications, the design (pooled or country-specific), and the items 
used. This lack of consensus hampers valid comparisons.
Recently, several researchers tested the measurement invariance of political 
trust in European and former Soviet countries by means of multiple group 
confirmatory factor analysis. This method provides a stringent test because every 
element of the measurement model (not just the number of factors) is specified 
beforehand and the model outputs allow researchers to discern the reasons for 
invariance in detail (Brown, 2006). The studies tested and supported different 
dimensional models of political trust. Whereas some show that it is a single-
dimensional construct, others provide evidence that a two-dimensional model of 
political trust in representative and implementing institutions reaches different 
levels of measurement invariance, depending on the countries of analysis and the 
chosen items (see Table 2).
Given these diverging measures and results, the question of the appropriate 
measurement model of political trust remains subject to debate. In addition, previ-
ous measurement invariance tests of political trust have focused on European and 
former Soviet countries, neglecting Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The purpose 
of this article is to determine: To what extent can the measurement invariance of 
political trust be established across the globe and if so, based on which measure-
ment model? 
1 The issue of comparability is further exacerbated by the fact that there is no uniform 
wording and response scale for political trust items. 
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The study extends previous analyses in several ways. First, it tests the mea-
surement invariance of political trust on a global scale in 32 electoral and lib-
eral democracies. Second, the analysis provides a detailed debate and conclusion 
regarding the dimensionality of the construct of political trust. Third, it discusses 
the suitability of the available items for cross-national comparisons in detail. Over-
all, the article’s conclusions and recommendations can be used to inform future 
cross-national studies of political trust. 
Since “any equivalence procedure can only be implemented successfully 
if an unambiguous specification of the concept is available” (van Deth, 2013, p. 
XXI), the article begins by defining political trust and by outlining three com-
peting dimensional models of political trust. The subsequent section describes the 
research design and the three alternative measurement models of political trust 
that follow from the dimensional models. In the analysis section, the measurement 
invariance test of political trust is presented. The article concludes by outlining 
the implications of the findings and recommendations for the comparative study of 
political trust.
Competing Dimensional Models of Political Trust
Political trust can be defined as people’s positive anticipatory expectation that, 
despite uncertainty, the conduct of the political trustee in question will be in line 
with their normative expectations (Miller & Listhaug, 1990; Möllering, 2006).2 
Researchers generally agree that trust in different political trustees such as parlia-
ment, the judiciary, and government can be distinguished theoretically (Levi & 
Stoker, 2000). They disagree on the empirical dimensionality of citizens’ construct 
of political trust, though, resulting in three competing dimensional models.
The first dimensional model proposes a distinction between trust in political 
authorities and trust in political institutions. Building on Easton’s (1975) classic 
model of political support, several researchers advocate that the two are related but 
separate dimensions of political trust (Dalton, 2004; Denters, Gabriel, & Torcal, 
2007; Norris, 2011). First and foremost, they assume that people perceive abstract 
and specific trustees separately: Abstract political institutions are characterized by 
rules that define relationships among political roles, thereby prescribing and con-
straining the interactions of political actors in general over time; specific politi-
2 To date, there is no commonly accepted definition of political trust. Some conceptual-
ize it as a kind of supportive behavior (Fisher, van Heerde, & Tucker, 2010) whereas 
others regard it as an attitude (Miller & Listhaug, 1990). Relatedly, the elements of 
the definitions of political trust that they stipulate do not coincide. Furthermore, some 
researchers state that the term ‘trust’ can ‘travel’ to political institutions without over-
stretching its conceptual core (Fuchs, Gabriel, & Völkl, 2002). Others maintain that 
‘trust’ in political institutions should be referred to as ‘confidence’ (Hardin, 2000).
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cal incumbents enact and interpret these roles within a particular period of time 
(March & Olsen, 1989). Second and consequently, while people may not trust the 
current political incumbents, they do not necessarily doubt that the conduct of the 
political institution in question will be in line with their normative expectations 
once the incumbents are no longer in office. At the same time, the two dimensions 
are related because incumbents affect the perception of the institutions. Proponents 
of this dimensional model assert that the distinction should be maintained all the 
same because it may yield more valid insights on the changes, sources, and conse-
quences of political trust (Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011). 
According to the second dimensional model, the distinction between trust in 
representative and implementing political institutions is more plausible. Several 
researchers assume that citizens’ political trust has two dimensions because people 
broadly categorize the responsibilities and characteristics of the work of political 
institutions into two groups. On the one hand, representative political institutions 
such as political parties, government, and parliament serve to make collectively 
binding decisions. By and large, their work is characterized by political controver-
sies and competition. On the other hand, implementing political institutions such 
as the courts and police are responsible for maintaining order and implementing 
the law. On the whole, political partisanship is less prominent in their daily work 
(Gabriel, 1999; Pickel & Walz, 1995; Rothstein & Stolle, 2003). Within this group 
of researchers, there is disagreement regarding the attribution of trust in civil ser-
vices, though. According to some, it is affected by people’s overall trust in imple-
menting political institutions as civil services serve to enact government policies 
(Gabriel, 1999). According to others, civil service officials may be perceived as 
agents of government precisely because they implement its laws, thereby politiciz-
ing the perception of the trustee (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). This in turn may cause 
people to attribute it to their overall trust in representative political institutions. 
Leaving aside these differences, proponents of this two-dimensional model gen-
erally argue that trust in representative and implementing political institutions is 
related because the latter act on the basis of laws that were drafted and adopted by 
the former (Fuchs et al., 2002). 
Still others have proposed a third, single-dimensional model of political trust. 
Some state that it especially applies to citizens in newly established democracies 
who have not had sufficient experience to distinguish between representative and 
implementing political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1994). Others maintain that 
this model also holds in established democracies. This may be because individu-
als learn to trust at an early age and generalize this socialization experience to the 
political realm. People’s generalized trust attitude is assumed to ‘spill up’ to politi-
cal institutions (Mishler & Rose, 2001). Another line of argument suggests that 
political trust is “a comprehensive assessment of the political culture that is preva-
lent within a political system” (Hooghe 2011, p. 275). As a system characteristic, 
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political culture is assumed to impact political actors and institutions alike. As a 
result, people evaluate political objects and form political trust ‘en bloc’. Therefore 
people are expected to trust political trustees to a greater or lesser extent without 
making more fine-grained distinctions.
These competing dimensional models suggest three alternative measurement 
models of political trust for the measurement invariance test. Depending on the 
dimensional model, the number of latent factors as well as the relational structure 
between the latent factors and observed items of political trust differ. These dimen-
sional models were therefore translated into measurement models for the analysis.
Research Design
Operationalization
The analysis of the measurement invariance of political trust is based on data from 
the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is the larg-
est non-commercial, cross-national, time-series survey of public opinion and value 
preferences. Its most recent wave (wave 6, 2010-2014) covers 57 countries around 
the world and includes a number of items measuring trust in different political 
trustees, thereby permitting a measurement invariance test of political trust across 
the globe (World Values Survey, 2017). Since there is no common set of political 
trust items, the items that were used most frequently in previous studies of the 
dimensionality of political trust were selected from those available in the WVS (see 
Tables 1 and 2): trust in the police, the courts, the government, political parties, 
parliament, and civil service. The items are measured on an ordinal scale with four 
response categories. For each of the political trustees, WVS respondents were asked 
to indicate “how much confidence [they] have in that organization: a great deal of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all”. The 
same items were administered to the respondents in the respective national lan-
guages. This reduces the chance that the measurement invariance test reflects dif-
ferences in item-wording rather than actual differences in respondents’ construct of 
political trust across countries. The original data were recoded to include only one 
kind of missing value and to range from 0 (none at all) to 3 (a great deal of trust).
Case Selection
The study analyzed the measurement invariance of political trust in electoral and 
liberal democracies. Non-democratic states were excluded because citizens’ rela-
tionship with and the functional interaction of political trustees such as govern-
ment and the courts differ in these countries. These differences may impact the way 
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the construct of political trust develops in people’s minds in democracies and non-
democracies (Mishler & Rose, 1997).3 This assumption is substantiated by Schnei-
der’s (2017) as well as Schaap and Scheepers’ (2014) analysis of the measurement 
invariance of political trust in European and former Soviet countries. They found 
that a greater level of measurement invariance could be established once former 
Soviet autocracies were excluded from the analysis. The study at hand therefore 
focused on democracies in order to eliminate this possible source of measurement 
non-equivalence. 
The countries included in the study were selected based on Polity IV (Center 
for Systemic Peace, 2016). Polity IV comprises indicators of institutional autoc-
racy and democracy (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2015). Countries’ polity score can 
range from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). In line with the thresh-
old provided on the Polity IV website (Marshall & Gurr, 2014), countries were 
included if their polity score was six or higher in the year the survey was conducted 
as well as four years prior to this year. 
The final sample consisted of 32 countries with 46,315 respondents. The 
selected countries as well as the sample sizes and missings per item are listed in 
Table A1 in the appendix.4 The survey samples are representative of the countries’ 
adult population (World Values Survey, 2017). 
3 As Breustedt and Stark (2015) argue, in authoritarian countries it is difficult for citi-
zens to distinguish political institutions because of the lack of a system of checks and 
balances. In addition, as elections are infrequent or inconsequential, political institu-
tions become mainly associated with the political incumbents. Therefore, people in 
authoritarian states most likely develop their trust in different political trustees in tan-
dem. According to Rivetti and Cavatorta (2017), political trust in democratic regimes 
is positive whereas in authoritarian regimes it is negative: “whereas positive political 
trust can be defined as trust in ethical, legal or just actions undertaken by the ruling 
authority, negative trust can be defined as trust in the fact that the authority will act 
predictably” (Rivetti & Cavatorta, 2017, p. 60). Still, political trust in authoritarian 
countries is not necessarily devoid of positive normative expectations. People’s nor-
mative expectations of political trustees may simply differ in authoritarian countries. 
Either way, measures of political trust in democracies and autocracies are not likely to 
be equivalent as responses to the same items are susceptible to construct bias. 
4 Table A1 reports the original sample sizes. Most items have less than 5% missing per 
country. Two issues stand out: Trust in civil service has > 5% missing in nine coun-
tries, 18.4% of the cases for trust in government are missing in Lebanon, and Japan is 
the country with the largest amount of missing data. Cases were dropped if they had 
missings on all six items for the analysis. Respondents from the WVS wave 6 survey 
in India, conducted in 2012, were excluded because the wave 6 data file also includes 
a more recent Indian survey sample from 2014. ‘Pairwise present’ was used to handle 
missing data (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010).
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Method
The measurement invariance (MI) of political trust was tested using multiple 
group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA). Alternative methods include item 
response theory and latent class analysis (Davidov et al., 2014; Kankaraš, Vermunt, 
& Moors, 2011; Millsap, 2011). The study used MGCFA because it is a widely 
applied method to test MI and because previous studies of the MI of political trust 
used this method. 
The analysis was conducted in three stages. Because there is no agreed upon 
measurement model of political trust, first, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was 
used to determine the model fit of the three alternative models derived from the 
dimensional models outlined above in each of the 32 countries. The best-fitting 
model served as the baseline model in the second step, the simultaneous analysis of 
MI across countries by means of MGCFA. Based on these empirical results as well 
as theoretical considerations, in the third step, this measurement model was revised 
and subsequently tested for MI.
Consonant with the three dimensional models described earlier, three mea-
surement models were developed as possible baseline models for the MI test (see 
Figures 1 to 3).5 Civil service was specified to load on trust in representative institu-
tions in line with previous exploratory analyses (see Table 1). None of the models 
included any error correlations. In the two-dimensional models, the latent factors 
were assumed to correlate.
The study took account of the ordinal measurement scale of the items. Lubke 
and Muthén (2004) have shown that treating ordered-categorical data as continuous 
may yield estimates that suggest that the factor structure found in different countries 
differs when, in fact, it is equivalent. To circumvent this issue, the study followed a 
common approach to estimate latent variable models for ordered-categorical items 
– the latent response variable model (Muthén & Asparouhov, 2002). 
This approach is outlined briefly as it affects the way MI tests are conducted. 
As indicated in Figures 1 to 3, the model estimation based on the latent response 
variable model assumes that the latent factor(s) of political trust (ξi) cause(s) the 
variance and covariance among latent response variables of political trust in six 
different political trustees (χ*i). The latent response variables are taken to have 
a continuous and normally distributed scale. Their relationship with the latent 
factor(s) is understood to be linear. Thus, as in standard MGCFA with continu-
ous items, each latent response variable has a factor loading (λi), an intercept (τi), 
and an error term. The latent response variables are assumed to be the unobserved 
5 Some researchers have distinguished between trust in political actors, representative 
political institutions, and implementing political institutions (Denters et al., 2007; Ga-
briel, 1999). This three-dimensional model could not be tested because of the limited 
number of survey items available in the WVS.
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Figure 1  Single-dimensional measurement model of political trust. Adapted 
from Davidov et al. (2011) and Poznyak et al. (2014). ξ (ksi): latent 
factor, κ (kappa): latent mean, φ (phi): factor variance, λ (lambda): 
factor loading, χ* (chi): latent response variable, τ (tau): intercept, δ 
(delta): error variance, χ (chi): observed variable, ν (nu): threshold.
latent counterparts of the observed ordered-categorical items of political trust (χi). 
The continuous nature of the latent response variables is roughly captured by the 
ordered-categorical response scale of the respective observed items. Each pair of 
response categories of the items represents a section of the continuous scale of the 
corresponding latent response variable. Each section therefore ends with a thresh-
old (νij). As a result, each latent response variable is related to its corresponding 
observed item through a set of thresholds, whereby the number of thresholds cor-
responds to the number of response categories minus one. Since the political trust 
items have four ordered response categories, the latent response variables each have 
three thresholds. That is to say, if χ1 represents the ordinal item of trust in par-
liament and χ*1 stands for the latent response variable of trust in parliament, χ*1 
reflects the amount of political trust needed to select a certain response category of 
χ1. An observed response of ‘0’ (none at all) in trust in parliament is expected if the 
level of χ*1 is less than or equal to the first threshold ν11. If χ*1 is greater than ν11 but 
less than or equal to the second threshold ν12, the predicted response is ‘1’ (not very 
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much confidence). If the latent response variable of trust in parliament χ*1 is greater 
than ν12 but less than or equal to the third threshold ν13, the predicted response is ‘2’ 
(quite a lot of confidence). χ*1 > ν13 corresponds to a response of ‘3’ (a great deal 
of confidence) (Byrne, 2012; Kline, 2016; Millsap & Yun-Tein, 2004; Muthén & 
Asparouhov, 2002).
Accounting for the ordinal nature of the political trust items affects the param-
eters that have to be invariant across countries in order for MI to hold and, relatedly, 
the levels of MI that can be tested. The invariance of factor loadings, intercepts, and 
(unlike in the case of continuous variables) thresholds has to be considered (Davi-
dov, Datler, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2011; Millsap & Yun-Tein, 2004). Research-
ers can test to what extent these parameters are invariant by applying increasingly 
restrictive equality constraints in MGCFA and examining the respective model fit 
by means of goodness-of-fit indices. In the case of ordered-categorical data, only 
two levels of MI are tested, namely configural and full MI (Davidov et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 2  Two-dimensional measurement model of trust in political authori-
ties and political institutions. Adapted from Davidov et al. (2011) and 
Poznyak et al. (2014). ξ (ksi): latent factor, κ (kappa): latent mean, 
φ (phi): factor variance, λ (lambda): factor loading, χ* (chi): latent 
response variable, τ (tau): intercept, δ (delta): error variance, χ (chi): 
observed variable, ν (nu): threshold.
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When testing for configural invariance, the estimated parameters are allowed to 
differ across countries. The test shows whether the number of factors and the pat-
tern of fixed and free item factor loadings is the same across countries (Vanden-
berg & Lance, 2000). If this model fits the data, it may be inferred that people 
in different countries respond to political trust items with the same construct in 
mind (Chen, 2008). If not, country-specific measures may be required (Pendergast, 
von der Embse, Kilgus, & Eklund, 2017). Configural invariance is a prerequisite 
for full MI. Full MI requires the unstandardized factor loadings, intercepts, and 
thresholds to be equal (Davidov et al., 2011). If full MI is supported by the data, 
it can be inferred that the items measure the same latent construct, albeit with dif-
ferent degrees of precision because the error variances and covariances were not 
constrained to be equal (Kline, 2016). In addition, full MI implies that people in the 
 
Figure 3  Two-dimensional measurement model of trust in representative and 
implementing political institutions. Adapted from Davidov et al. 
(2011) and Poznyak et al. (2014). ξ (ksi): latent factor, κ (kappa): latent 
mean, φ (phi): factor variance, λ (lambda): factor loading, χ* (chi): 
latent response variable, τ (tau): intercept, δ (delta): error variance, χ 
(chi): observed variable, ν (nu): threshold.
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respective countries use the response scale in the same manner (Poznyak, Meule-
mann, Abts, & Bishop, 2014).6
The ordered-categorical nature of the data has a bearing on the appropriate 
choice of the method of estimation. As Brown (2006) notes, ignoring the fact that 
the data may be non-normally distributed could lead to incorrect parameter esti-
mates, standard errors, and test statistics. The analyses were therefore run with the 
mean- and variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimator in Mplus 
(Version 8) using the raw data. This estimator provides robust standard errors and 
(more) accurate estimates of factor loadings as well as corrected model test statis-
tics. As Beauducel and Herzberg (2006) showed, it is superior to maximum likeli-
hood estimation especially when the number of response categories is small, as in 
the case of the present study. 
In order to conduct MI analyses, the scale of the latent factors has to be 
defined. Because latent factors are unobserved, they have no definite metric scale. 
In MGCFA, there are two common ways to establish this scale – the reference 
indicator method and the fixed factor method. When using the latter, the factor 
variances of the latent factors are fixed to one in all countries. This assumes that 
the factor variances are equal across countries. When applying the former, one 
factor loading per latent factor is fixed to one in all countries. Here the assumption 
is that this factor loading is invariant (Byrne, 2012). With regard to political trust, 
there is no evidence to justify either assumption. In this study, the reference indica-
tor method was used because it was more straightforward to make a case for using 
single reference indicators.7
6 Unlike in the case of continuous data, the invariance of factor loadings alone does 
not establish comparability of the political trust measure because the item probability 
curves depend on the factor loadings, intercepts, and thresholds (Davidov et al., 2011; 
Muthén & Asparouhov, 2002). As a result, only two levels of measurement invariance 
were tested unlike in previous measurement invariance tests of political trust (Table 
2). See Bowen and Masa (2015) for a summary of arguments in favor and against this 
practice.
7 In order to choose appropriate reference indicators, two exploratory factor analyses 
(EFA) were carried out per country (principal axis extraction; promax rotation). In the 
single-factor EFA, trust in parliament was the marker item in 22 out of 32 countries. In 
the two-factor EFA, in 28 out of 32 countries, trust in parliament was the item that load-
ed most strongly on one latent factor and in 17 out of 32 countries, trust in the police 
was the marker item of the other latent factor. Consequently, trust in parliament was 
used as the reference indicator in the single-dimensional model and trust in parliament 
as well as trust in the police were used as reference indicators in the two-dimensional 
model of trust in implementing and representative institutions. Trust in parliament and 
trust in government were used as reference indicators in the two-dimensional model of 
trust in political authorities and institutions. Trust in government was chosen because 
the author deemed it more likely that government is perceived in a comparable manner 
across countries compared to political parties because its structure and functions are 
more similar, differences notwithstanding. Table A2 in the appendix includes a robust-
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Depending on the level of MI tested, additional parameters have to be fixed 
in order for the measurement model to be identified. The choice depends in part on 
the computer program and the model parameterization. Mplus was chosen because 
of its flexibility when testing the invariance of ordered-categorical items (Millsap 
& Yun-Tein, 2004). In practice, thresholds (νi) and intercepts (τi) cannot be esti-
mated simultaneously. By default, Mplus fixes all intercepts of the latent response 
variables to zero, thereby allowing researchers to test the MI of thresholds (Davi-
dov et al., 2011). In addition, Mplus offers two parameterization methods – delta 
and theta parameterization. Unlike delta parameterization, theta parameterization 
includes error variances for the latent response variables (δ) as estimated parame-
ters (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017). This study used theta parameterization as pre-
vious MGCFAs (see Table 2) indicated that the error variances of some of the items 
might be correlated. In order to identify the measurement models, the following 
parameters were fixed. In the configural invariance model, one factor loading per 
latent factor as well as the error variances were fixed to one and the factor means 
were fixed to zero in all countries. In the full MI model, one factor loading per 
latent factor was fixed to one in all countries and the remaining factor loadings as 
well as the thresholds were constrained to be equal. In addition, the error variances 
were fixed to one and the factor means were fixed to zero in the reference country8 
and freely estimated in the other countries (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017).
The overall fit of the measurement models to the data was evaluated according 
to several criteria. Χ2 as the classic fit index indicates exact fit between the esti-
mated model parameters and the observed data. While this is informative, it is an 
unduly strong assumption for real-world data. In addition, Χ2 is sensitive to sample 
size (Byrne, 2012; Meade, Johnson, & Braddy, 2008). Consequently, the goodness 
of fit evaluation was informed by the Χ2 results but focused on three additional fit 
indices: the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative 
fit index (CFI), and the Tucker-Lewis-Index (TLI). The 90% confidence interval of 
the RMSEA is provided to show how precise its point estimates are (MacCallum, 
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Following Yu (2002), the following cut-off criteria 
were used: TLI ≥0.95, CFI ≥0.96, and RMSEA ≤ 0.05. 
The analysis also considered focal areas of ill fit. The proportion of variance 
of the indicator explained by the latent factor (‘R-Square’ in Mplus) was used to 
evaluate whether the items were meaningfully related to the respective latent fac-
tor. The extent of the correlation between the latent factors was taken into account 
to determine discriminant validity between the latent factors in case of the two-
dimensional models of political trust (Brown, 2006). In addition, the study followed 
a dual modal two-pronged strategy proposed by Byrne and van de Vijver (2010). 
ness test for Model A of the MGCFA (see Table 7). The analysis was not sensitive to the 
selection of these reference indicators.
8 Model C2: Australia; Model C3: Poland.
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They suggest looking for patterns of misspecification that indicate that individual 
items, individual countries or groups of countries are the reason for measurement 
non-invariance. Modification indices, which approximate how much the model fit 
(Χ2) would improve if the constrained or fixed parameter in question was freely 
estimated, can be used to discern such patterns (Brown, 2006). Because of X2’s 
sensitivity to sample size, it was considered in tandem with the respective expected 
parameter of change (EPC) value. Overall, these criteria provided information on 
the fit of the measurement models as well as how to revise the measurement models 
in order to establish full invariance. 
Analysis 
Establishing the Baseline Model of Political Trust
The first step in testing the MI of political trust on a global scale was to establish 
the baseline model. Tables 3 to 5 present the overall goodness-of-fit indices for 
each of the three alternative measurement models tested separately in 32 countries. 
In terms of CFI and TLI, the two-factor model of trust in political authorities and 
political institutions yielded the worst fit. As shown in Table 3, the two indices 
were above the recommended cut-off value in only five out of 32 countries. The 
RMSEA did not support the model in any of the countries. The latent covariance 
matrix of the factors was not positive definite in six countries. In all six countries, 
this was because the latent factor correlation was estimated to have an out of range 
value (> 1.0), signifying model misspecification because some or all of the items 
of one latent factor were more strongly related to some or all of the items of the 
other latent factor (Brown, 2006). In comparison, the single-factor model of politi-
cal trust fit the data better (see Table 4). The CFI and TLI indicated good model fit 
in eight out of 32 countries. Finally, the two-factor model of trust in implementing 
and representative political institutions fit the data best (see Table 5). In 28 out of 32 
countries, the CFI and TLI were above the recommended cut-off values. Further-
more, only in this model was the RMSEA smaller than 0.05 in two countries and its 
confidence interval indicated a good precision of this point estimate.
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Table 3 Fit Measures for the Two-Factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis of 
Trust in Political Authorities and Political Institutions
country n χ2 (df) p-value CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI) sum-mary
all countries 46315  17403.165 (8) 0.00 0.953 0.912 0.217 (0.214-0.219)
Argentina 1025 330.017 (8) 0.00 0.956 0.917 0.198 (0.180-0.217)
Australia 1453 336.644 (8) 0.00 0.966 0.936 0.168 (0.153-0.184)
Brazil 1486 the latent variable covariance matrix is not positive definite
Chile 999 the latent variable covariance matrix is not positive definite
Colombia 1509 the latent variable covariance matrix is not positive definite
Cyprus 999 437.876 (8) 0.00 0.941 0.890 0.232 (0.214-0.251)
Estonia 1531 781.502 (8) 0.00 0.948 0.902 0.251 (0.237-0.266)
Georgia 1185 759.328 (8) 0.00 0.965 0.935 0.282 (0.265-0.299)
Germany 2043 715.828 (8) 0.00 0.960 0.925 0.208 (0.195-0.221)
Ghana 1552 the latent variable covariance matrix is not positive definite
India 1578 149.767 (8) 0.00 0.880 0.774 0.106 (0.092-0.121)
Japan 2350 1467.502 (8) 0.00 0.975 0.954 0.279 (0.267-0.291) (√)
Lebanon 1183 68.742 (8) 0.00 0.979 0.961 0.080 (0.063-0.098) (√)
Malaysia 1299 the latent variable covariance matrix is not positive definite
Mexico 2000 410.193 (8) 0.00 0.972 0.947 0.159 (0.146-0.172)
Netherlands 1849 818.027 (8) 0.00  0.982 0.967 0.234 (0.221-0.248) (√)
New Zealand 812 236.709 (8) 0.00 0.962 0.930 0.188 (0.167-0.209)
Peru 1206 291.760 (8) 0.00 0.971 0.945 0.171 (0.155-0.189)
Philippines 1200 438.337 (8) 0.00 0.940 0.888 0.212 (0.195-0.229)
Poland 957 304.620 (8) 0.00 0.968 0.939 0.197 (0.178-0.216)
Romania 1488 742.378 (8) 0.00 0.960 0.924 0.248 (0.233-0.264)
Slovenia 1060 298.563 (8) 0.00 0.980 0.963 0.185 (0.167-0.203) (√)
South Africa 3477 973.607 (8) 0.00 0.971 0.946 0.186 (0.177-0.196)
South Korea 1198 the latent variable covariance matrix is not positive definite
Spain 1180 287.923 (8) 0.00 0.943 0.894 0.172 (0.155-0.190)
Sweden 1205 516.348 (8) 0.00 0.948 0.902 0.230 (0.213-0.247)
Taiwan 1204 224.002 (8) 0.00 0.976 0.956 0.150 (0.133-0.167) (√)
Trinidad and 
Tobago 994 503.494 (8) 0.00 0.960 0.926 0.250 (0.231-0.268)
Turkey 1593 528.707 (8) 0.00 0.951 0.909 0.202 (0.188-0.217)
Ukraine 1500 934.882 (8) 0.00 0.968 0.941 0.278 (0.263-0.293)
United States 2205 1429.113 (8) 0.00 0.931 0.871 0.284 (0.272-0.296)
Uruguay 995 431.481 (8) 0.00 0.943 0.893 0.231 (0.212-0.249)
Note. WLSMV estimator (theta parameterization), pairwise present was used to handle missing data 
(Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010), df = degrees of freedom, CFI = comparative fit index, TLI = Tuck-
er-Lewis-Index, RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation, 90% CI = 90% confidence in-
terval, parameter of fit values above the recommended thresholds (Yu, 2002) are in bold, summary 
(√) indicates that two out of three fit indices are above the recommended thresholds, summary √ 
indicates that CFI, TLI, and RMSEA are above the recommended thresholds. Data are from the 
World Values Survey 2010-2014, 32 countries.
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Table 4 Fit Measures for the Single-Factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis of 
Political Trust
country n χ2 (df) p-value CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI) sum-mary
all countries 46315 18131.958 (9) 0.00 0.951 0.919 0.209 (0.206-0.211)
Argentina 1025 339.428 (9) 0.00 0.954 0.924 0.189 (0.172-0.207)
Australia 1453 342.404 (9) 0.00  0.965 0.942 0.160 (0.145-0.174)
Brazil 1486 467.487 (9) 0.00 0.947 0.911 0.185 (0.171-0.200)
Chile 999 194.345 (9) 0.00 0.977 0.962 0.144 (0.126-0.161) (√)
Colombia 1509 603.427 (9) 0.00 0.951 0.919 0.209 (0.195-0.224)
Cyprus 999 478.871 (9) 0.00 0.936 0.893 0.229 (0.211-0.246)
Estonia 1531 803.514 (9) 0.00 0.946 0.911 0.240 (0.226-0.254)
Georgia 1185 804.307 (9) 0.00 0.963 0.938 0.273 (0.257-0.289)
Germany 2043 739.886 (9) 0.00 0.959 0.931 0.199 (0.187-0.212)
Ghana 1552 519.222 (9) 0.00 0.931 0.885 0.191 (0.177-0.205)
India 1578 158.753 (9) 0.00 0.873 0.788 0.103 (0.089-0.117)
Japan 2350 1593.134 (9) 0.00 0.973 0.956 0.274 (0.262-0.285) (√)
Lebanon 1183 81.557 (9) 0.00 0.975 0.959 0.083 (0.067-0.099) (√)
Malaysia 1299 878.559 (9) 0.00 0.955 0.925 0.273 (0.258-0.288)
Mexico 2000 411.296 (9) 0.00 0.972 0.953 0.149 (0.137-0.162) (√)
Netherlands 1849 891.088 (9) 0.00 0.981 0.968 0.230 (0.218-0.243) (√)
New Zealand 812 245.580 (9) 0.00 0.961 0.935 0.180 (0.161-0.200)
Peru 1206 294.694 (9) 0.00 0.971 0.951 0.162 (0.147-0.178) (√)
Philippines 1200 437.427 (9) 0.00 0.940 0.901 0.199 (0.183-0.215)
Poland 957 319.692 (9) 0.00 0.966 0.944 0.190 (0.172-0.208)
Romania 1488 768.958 (9) 0.00 0.958 0.930 0.238 (0.224-0.253)
Slovenia 1060 339.944 (9) 0.00 0.978 0.963 0.186 (0.170-0.203) (√)
South Africa 3477 1041.826 (9) 0.00 0.969 0.949 0.182 (0.172-0.191)
South Korea 1198 814.982 (9) 0.00 0.964 0.940 0.273 (0.258-0.289)
Spain 1180 395.232 (9) 0.00 0.922 0.870 0.191 (0.175-0.207)
Sweden 1205 546.657 (9) 0.00 0.945 0.908 0.223 (0.207-0.239)
Taiwan 1204 222.983 (9) 0.00 0.977 0.961 0.141 (0.125-0.157) (√)
Trinidad and 
Tobago 994 546.575 (9) 0.00 0.957 0.928 0.245 (0.228-0.263)
Turkey 1593 570.242 (9) 0.00 0.948 0.913 0.198 (0.184-0.212)
Ukraine 1500 1003.718 (9) 0.00 0.966 0.943 0.271 (0.257-0.286)
United States 2205 1479.265 (9) 0.00 0.929 0.882 0.272 (0.261-0.284)
Uruguay 995 442.719 (9) 0.00 0.942 0.903 0.220 (0.203-0.238)
Note. WLSMV estimator (theta parameterization), pairwise present was used to handle missing data 
(Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010), df = degrees of freedom, CFI = comparative fit index, TLI = Tuck-
er-Lewis-Index, RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation, 90% CI = 90% confidence in-
terval, parameter of fit values above the recommended thresholds (Yu, 2002) are in bold, summary 
(√) indicates that two out of three fit indices are above the recommended thresholds, summary √ 
indicates that CFI, TLI, and RMSEA are above the recommended thresholds. Data are from the 
World Values Survey 2010-2014, 32 countries.
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Table 5 Fit Measures for the Two-Factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Po-
litical Trust in Implementing and Representative Political Institutions
country n χ2 (df) p-value CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI) sum-mary
all countries 46315 4004.959 (8) 0.000 0.989 0.980 0.104 (0.101-0.107) (√)
Argentina 1025 25.885 (8) 0.001 0.998 0.995 0.047 (0.027-0.067) √
Australia 1453 149.490 (8) 0.00 0.985 0.972 0.110 (0.095-0.126) (√)
Brazil 1486 278.099 (8) 0.00 0.969 0.941 0.151 (0.136-0.166)
Chile 999 195.118 (8) 0.00 0.977 0.956 0.153 (0.135-0.172) (√)
Colombia 1509 522.132 (8) 0.00 0.958 0.921 0.206 (0.192-0.222)
Cyprus 999 82.736 (8) 0.00 0.990 0.981 0.097 (0.078-0.116) (√)
Estonia 1531 221.914 (8) 0.00 0.986 0.973 0.132 (0.117-0.147) (√)
Georgia 1185 316.563 (8) 0.00 0.986 0.973 0.180 (0.164-0.198) (√)
Germany 2043 128.285 (8) 0.00 0.993 0.987 0.086 (0.073-0.099) (√)
Ghana 1552 168.182 (8) 0.00 0.978 0.960 0.114 (0.099-0.129) (√)
India 1578 129.277 (8) 0.00 0.897 0.807 0.098 (0.084-0.113)
Japan 2350 117.045 (8) 0.00 0.998 0.997 0.076 (0.064-0.089) (√)
Lebanon 1183 28.580 (8) 0.00 0.993 0.987 0.047 (0.029-0.066) √
Malaysia 1299 556.899 (8) 0.00 0.972 0.947 0.230 (0.214-0.246)
Mexico 2000 211.765 (8) 0.00 0.986 0.973 0.113 (0.100-0.126) (√)
Netherlands 1849 213.724 (8) 0.00 0.995 0.992 0.118 (0.105-0.132) (√)
New Zealand 812 48.940 (8) 0.00 0.993 0.987 0.079 (0.059-0.101) (√)
Peru 1206 102.030 (8) 0.00 0.990 0.982 0.099 (0.082-0.116) (√)
Philippines 1200 187.409 (8) 0.00 0.975 0.953 0.137 (0.120-0.154) (√)
Poland 957 96.655 (8) 0.00 0.990 0.982 0.108 (0.089-0.127) (√)
Romania 1488 195.538 (8) 0.00 0.990 0.981 0.126 (0.111-0.141) (√)
Slovenia 1060 56.482 (8) 0.00 0.997 0.994 0.076 (0.058-0.095) (√)
South Africa 3477 467.079 (8) 0.00 0.986 0.975 0.128 (0.119-0.139) (√)
South Korea 1198 564.953 (8) 0.00 0.975 0.953 0.241 (0.224-0.258) (√)
Spain 1180 156.665 (8) 0.00 0.970 0.944 0.125 (0.109-0.143)
Sweden 1205 98.056 (8) 0.00 0.991 0.983 0.097 (0.080-0.114) (√)
Taiwan 1204 112.167 (8) 0.00 0.989 0.979 0.104 (0.087-0.121) (√)
Trinidad and 
Tobago 994 102.419 (8) 0.00 0.992 0.986 0.109 (0.091-0.128) (√)
Turkey 1593 204.398 (8) 0.00 0.982 0.966 0.124 (0.110-0.139) (√)
Ukraine 1500 108.100 (8) 0.00 0.997 0.994 0.091 (0.076-0.107) (√)
United States 2205 537.652 (8) 0.00 0.974  0.952 0.173 (0.161-0.186) (√)
Uruguay 995 54.921 (8) 0.00 0.994 0.988 0.077 (0.058-0.097) (√)
Note. WLSMV estimator (theta parameterization), pairwise present was used to handle missing data 
(Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010), df = degrees of freedom, CFI = comparative fit index, TLI = Tuck-
er-Lewis-Index, RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation, 90% CI = 90% confidence in-
terval, parameter of fit values above the recommended thresholds (Yu, 2002) are in bold, summary 
(√) indicates that two out of three fit indices are above the recommended thresholds, summary √ 
indicates that CFI, TLI, and RMSEA are above the recommended thresholds. Data are from the 
World Values Survey 2010-2014, 32 countries.
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At the same time, the inspection of focal areas of ill fit of the CFAs of the 
two-factor model of trust in implementing and representative political institutions 
suggested several items and countries of concern. Χ2 strongly varied across coun-
tries, ranging from 564.953 in South Korea to 25.885 in Argentina (see Table 5). 
The standardized correlation coefficient between the two latent factors was > .85 
in five countries, indicating low discriminant validity (see Table 6). These aspects 
point to possible countries as a reason for measurement non-invariance. As for the 
items, ‘trust in civil service’ was the item with the lowest proportion of explained 
variance in 21 countries (see Table 6). In addition, the modification and expected 
parameter change indices recommended a positive cross-loading between the latent 
factor ‘trust in implementing political institutions’ and the item ‘trust in civil ser-
vice’ in 17 countries. In 13 countries, this modification index value was the largest 
among all suggested cross-loadings between a latent factor of political trust and 
a political trust item (see Table 6). This indicates that ‘trust in civil service’ is an 
ambiguous item not as meaningfully related to the construct of political trust as the 
other items. Furthermore, in 22 countries, the modification and expected parameter 
change indices for error co-variances pointed out that the model fit would improve 
if a cross-loading were added between ‘trust in parliament’ and ‘trust in political 
parties’. This modification index was the largest value for suggested error correla-
tions in nine countries (see Table 6). 
Based on these results, the two-factor model of trust in implementing and 
representative political institutions was chosen as the baseline model for the 
MGCFA. The focal areas of ill fit informed its revision for the MI test across 
countries.
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Testing the Measurement Invariance of Political Trust 
Table 7 presents the results of the MI test of political trust in 32 democracies across 
the globe. Initially, the configural invariance of the baseline model was tested 
(Model A). While the CFI and TLI indicated good model fit, the RMSEA was 
well above the cut-off criterion. Paying heed to the focal areas of ill fit that were 
discerned in the single-country CFAs (see Tables 5 and 6), trust in civil service was 
Table 7 Fit Measures for the Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis of 
Political Trust
Model χ2 (df) p-value CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI)
Model A
(all items and countries)
1. Configural invariance 6457.907 (256) 0.00 0.987 0.976 0.129 (0.127-0.132)
Model B
(excluding trust in civil service)
1. Configural invariance 3915.855 (128) 0.00 0.991 0.978 0.143 (0.139-0.147)
Model C1
(excluding trust in civil service, correlated error between trust in parliament and trust in 
political parties)
1. Configural invariance 919.890 (96) 0.00 0.998 0.994 0.077 (0.073-0.082)
Model C2
(excluding trust in civil service, correlated errors between trust in parliament and trust 
in political parties, including Australia, Brazil, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, 
Ghana, India, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South 
Korea, Sweden, Trinidad & Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay)
1. Configural invariance 235.782 (57) 0.00 0.999 0.998 0.048 (0.042-0.055)
2. Full invariance 5430.023 (255) 0.00 0.980 0.985 0.123 (0.120-0.126)
Model C3
(excluding trust in civil service, correlated errors between trust in parliament and trust in 
political parties, including Poland, Romania, Slovenia)
2. Full invariance 115.991 (31) 0.00 0.998 0.998 0.048 (0.039-0.058)
Note. WLSMV estimator (theta parameterization), pairwise present was used to handle 
missing data (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010), df = degrees of freedom, CFI = com-
parative fit index, TLI = Tucker-Lewis-Index, RMSEA = root mean square error of 
approximation, 90% CI = 90% confidence interval, parameter of fit values above the 
recommended thresholds (Yu, 2002) are in bold. Data are from the World Values Survey 
2010-2012, 32 countries.
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excluded from the measurement model (Model B). This improved the CFI and TLI 
somewhat and the Χ2 notably. 
Again based on the findings from the single-country CFAs, errors of trust in 
parliament and trust in political parties were then allowed to correlate (Model C1). 
This error correlation indicates that the two measurement errors are systematically 
related because some of the shared variance of the two items is due to another com-
mon outside cause. Substantively, most likely, this is because political parties play a 
major role in parliament unlike in the other political institutions. The model adjust-
ment considerably improved the Χ2, the CFI and TLI as well as the RMSEA. The 
latter remained above the recommended cutoff criterion, however. 
Based on the results of Model C1, 13 countries were excluded because of 
model fit issues – eight countries because the factor correlation exceeded .859, two 
countries because the cross-loading between trust in parliament and trust in politi-
cal parties was not significant (Argentina)10 or negative (Spain) and three countries 
because the highest modification index indicated ill specification owing to a miss-
ing cross-loading between the latent factor trust in implementing institutions and 
trust in political parties (Netherlands: 158.388, Turkey: 69.156), and trust in govern-
ment and trust in the courts (USA: 161.571) (Model C2). Model C2 – including 19 
electoral and liberal democracies – reached configural invariance. In all of these 
countries, the model fit the data well: the unstandardized factor loadings and error 
correlation were significant at the .05 level; the size of the completely standard-
ized factor loadings was substantial and their direction positive, as expected; the 
completely standardized factor correlations were all <.85; the error variances were 
positive and the modification indices were all < 26. Model C2 did not reach full 
invariance, however.11 
When the data do not support full invariance, researchers have several options 
(Davidov, Dülmer, Schlüter, Schmidt, & Meulemann, 2012). A popular strategy is 
to test for partial MI, that is, to test for the equivalence of some but not all factor 
loadings and thresholds (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989). Previous MI tests 
of political trust have commonly opted for this solution (see Table 2). Especially 
in large-N studies, however, discerning patterns in modification indices to deter-
mine which parameters should be estimated freely becomes increasingly unwieldy 
(Byrne & van de Vijver, 2010).
Another, hitherto unexplored alternative to this data-driven solution in MI 
tests of political trust is a theory-driven strategy. Byrne and van de Vijver (2010) 
suggest testing the MI of subsamples of countries clustered according to a theoreti-
9 Chile, Colombia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, and Taiwan.
10 This cross-loading was also non-significant in Lebanon.
11 In addition, in Model C2 the residual covariance matrix was not positive definite in 
Japan. The residual variance for trust in government was negative, indicating that the 
estimated factor loading did not fit the data well.
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cally meaningful criterion. With regard to political trust, the post-communist coun-
tries are a case in point. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, Mishler and Rose 
(1994) argued that citizens in these countries cannot clearly distinguish between 
political trustees because they lack experience with them. From the perspective of 
political socialization theory, one could argue that almost three decades of dem-
ocratic socialization have refined, and possibly diversified, people’s construct of 
political trust in former communist countries in Europe more (Klingemann, Fuchs, 
& Zielonka, 2006). Inspired by these arguments, the MI of political trust was 
tested for the subsample of six post-communist European democracies in this study 
(Model C3). Full invariance of the model was supported by the data from Poland, 
Romania, and Slovenia. These results indicate that Mishler and Rose’s (1994) gen-
eral verdict no longer holds.12 What is more, this brief demonstration of a theory-
driven strategy to establish MI shows that similar tests for other subsets of coun-
tries could add to our insights on existing theoretical assumptions about the reasons 
for MI of political trust or lack thereof.
Insights and Recommendations for Future Political 
Trust Research 
This article set out to answer to what extent the MI of political trust can be estab-
lished in 32 democracies across the globe by means of MGCFA and if so, based 
on which measurement model. The single-country analyses showed that the data 
supported the two-dimensional model of trust in implementing and representative 
political institutions best. In the MGCFA, this model was not equivalent across all 
32 democracies, however, because of three sources of bias (van de Vijver & Tan-
zer, 2004). First, item bias of ‘trust in civil service’ affected the model fit. Second, 
construct bias was apparent: The latent factor of trust in representative institutions 
did not sufficiently account for the shared variance between trust in parliament 
and trust in political parties in all countries. ‘Trust in civil service’ was therefore 
dropped and an error covariance was added to the measurement model in order to 
measure the construct of political trust in a more valid manner. Configural invari-
ance of this revised two-dimensional model was established in 19 democracies. 
Additional revisions may be required in order to successfully remedy construct 
bias in the remaining 13 countries. Third, while the revised measurement model 
was fully invariant in three post-communist countries in eastern and southeastern 
Europe, the results suggest that method bias prevented full invariance in the other 
countries. Non-invariance of factor loadings and the thresholds indicate that the 
respondents did not use the response scale in the same manner. 
12 See Schaap and Scheepers (2014) for a similar finding.
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These results support previous studies and contradict others. They are in line 
with authors who distinguish between political trust in implementing and repre-
sentative institutions conceptually (see for example Gabriel, 1999). Likewise, the 
analysis corroborates those empirical studies that found political trust to be two-
dimensional (see Tables 1 and 2). Like previous analyses (see for example Braun, 
2013 in Table 1), it also empirically reflects the ambiguity of the position of trust 
in civil service in the two dimensions of political trust described at the beginning 
of the article. The study does not, however, correspond to MGCFA that established 
MI of a single-dimensional model of political trust in Europe. This may be because 
the items used were not identical. 
The results of this study underline that measurement invariance of political 
trust must not be assumed when testing theories about the changes, sources or con-
sequences of political trust. Comparative political trust researchers can enhance 
the validity of their research findings on the generalizability of political trust theo-
ries by specifying the measurement model appropriately and carefully selecting 
the political trust items and countries. The findings therefore remind comparative 
researchers to use the ample cross-national survey data available methodically. 
The findings are also informative for the future conceptualization of political 
trust. They provide reason to infer that, by and large, people in democracies across 
the globe have a two-dimensional construct of political trust. More conceptual 
work is needed, however, to identify the pertinent political trustees within these 
dimensions across countries. 
In addition, the study contributes to insights regarding the valid measurement 
of political trust. Because the item ‘trust in civil service’ is apparently not as mean-
ingfully related to the construct of political trust as the other items, future studies 
should carefully consider whether to include it. On a more general note, the study 
criticized the fact that there is no common set of comparable items to measure 
political trust. Such a set is crucial, however, because the content of the measured 
construct may be altered depending on the chosen items (Byrne & van de Vijver, 
2010). Lack thereof impedes the cumulation of research on political trust.
A number of questions follow from this study. Future comparative research 
on political trust could study the reasons for the apparent bias. Do country-specific 
response tendencies affect MI and if so, why do they occur with items of politi-
cal trust? Why is it so difficult to measure civil service in a comparable manner 
across countries? Last but not least, the study raises questions about the sources of 
political trust. The error covariance between trust in parliament and political par-
ties indicates that they are not exclusively determined by people’s overall level of 
trust. This could imply that their sources are more trustee-specific than those of the 
overall construct of political trust. Overall, the results of the study suggest that, in 
democracies, political trust is neither a single-dimensional construct nor a blanket 
judgment.
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Table A2 Comparison of Configural Invariance Results with Different 
Reference Indicators for Model A
reference indicator χ2 (df) p-value CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI)
trust in parliament 
and trust in police 6457.907 (256) 0.00 0.987  0.976 0.129 (0.127-0.132)
trust in parliament 
and trust in court 6481.266 (256) 0.00 0.987 0.976 0.130 (0.127-0.132)
trust in political par-
ties and trust in police 6453.700 (256) 0.00 0.987  0.976 0.129 (0.127-0.132)
trust in political par-
ties and trust in court 6471.272 (256) 0.00 0.987 0.976 0.130 (0.127-0.132)
trust in government 
and trust in police 6454.196 (256) 0.00 0.987 0.976 0.129 (0.127-0.132)
trust in government 
and trust in court 6485.580 (256) 0.00 0.987 0.976 0.130 (0.127-0.132)
trust in civil service 
and trust in police 6459.617 (256) 0.00 0.987 0.976 0.129 (0.127-0.132)
trust in civil service 
and trust in court 6490.506 (256) 0.00 0.987 0.976 0.130 (0.127-0.132)
factor variance=1/fac-
tor mean=0 6457.732 (256) 0.00 0.987 0.976 0.129 (0.127-0.132)
Note. WLSMV estimator (theta parameterization), pairwise present was used to handle 
missing data (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010), df = degrees of freedom, CFI = compara-
tive fit index, TLI = Tucker-Lewis-Index, RMSEA = root mean square error of approxi-
mation, 90% CI = 90% confidence interval. Data are from the World Values Survey 
2010-2012, 32 countries.
